TALK PRESENTED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE RIVERVIEW DHARMA CENTRE ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2016, AND AGAIN TO THE BUDDHA CENTRE ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2025 (REVISED)

INTRODUCTION

Any tradition that attributes a special authority to one or more founders faces the same problem: How do we know what the original teachings were and, once we identify them, how are we to understand their meaning? The latter ranges from the problem of translation to the problem of understanding the meaning of meaning itself, while the former also relates to the problem of preservation. This aspect of Buddhism is like any other religion. Islam has the Qur’an, Christianity the Gospel, the Jews the Torah; Hindus have the Vedas and the Upanishads, the Taoists have the Tao Te Ching. The historicity of some of these texts is ambiguous; traditions that emphasize an historical teacher intensify the hermeneutical problem. In the case of Buddhism, the primary historical source represents a developmental period of about 350 years. Even if we reject the naïve hermeneutic that a later text is automatically invalid, identifying the historical core of the original teaching is interesting, subject to the proviso that we cannot conflate “oldest” with “literally identical to the words of the Buddha,” which are unknown and unknowable. Still less can we know what the Buddha thought. In addition, we may assume that there were many other texts of the same or even earlier provenance that were lost or suppressed.

Even more vexed is the question whether originality even matters. Are the literal words of the Buddha necessarily definitive? The Buddha, like all historical phenomena, existed in a relative and contingent context, and therefore all his manifestations and appearances are relative, including whatever insights the Buddha bestowed directly upon his contemporaries and upon those of us who hear them through an intermediary. Even if we accept the archaic claim that the Buddha was omniscient (in some sense), we may question the omniscience of his disciples. Theravadins, anticipating this problem, insist that the arhants were infallible, but even this leaves open the questions of unknown teachings, lost texts, and subsequent misinterpretation by non-arhants. The evidence of the texts themselves is that the Buddha tailored his teachings to his audience. The true object of study in Buddhism is not the person or circumstances of the historical Buddha, it is what the Buddha himself indicated in his thoughts, words, and actions, i.e., the teaching, to which he pointed like the famous finger pointing at the moon. The Pali Canon says that the Buddha de-emphasized leadership and directed his followers to understand the teaching directly for themselves. Thus, Buddhology is based on a false premise. Any study of the oldest Buddhist scripture must have for its objective the revelation of the one true object of study, the teaching itself. This is a significantly larger study than historicism or even linguistics can muster. The Pali Canon says that the Buddha hesitated to teach, and finally only agreed to teach after being petitioned by “God” himself; he said he knew much more than he taught; he taught different truths to different people, based on their circumstances and needs, including morality to the householders, meditation to the monastics, and wisdom to the arhants. The teaching is protean and adjusts itself continuously to the circumstances of the time. For this reason alone, fundamentalism is fatuous.

Stratification in the Pali Canon has been a special subject of study for a century now, largely based on the linguistic studies of Pali specialists, but most of the progress in the field was made by the time that Pande published the first edition of his Studies in the Origin of Buddhism, which he updated till his recent death in 2011. In that book, he cites a theory of stratification proposed by the great early 20th century Buddhist translator, T.W. Rhys Davids. Law’s elaborate critique only reinforces Rhys Davids’s conclusion, with a few minor changes that do not affect our argument here. According to both Rhys Davids and Law, the first (i.e., oldest) four items in the list are:

• The simple statements of Buddhist doctrine now found, in identical words, in paragraphs or verses recurring in all the books.
• Episodes found, in identical words, in two or more of the existing books.
• The Silas (ethical precepts), the Parayana the last section of the Sutta Nipata), the Octades (Aṭṭhaka, the fourth section of the Sutta Nipata), the Patimokkha (the monastic code of ethics).
• The Digha, Majjhima, Anguttara, and Samyutta Nikayas (“collections”).

Although scholars have suggested a few more potentially archaic texts, the consensus view seems to be that the fourth and fifth chapters of the Sutta Nipata, denominated the Parayana and the Atthaka, are among the oldest if not the oldest canonical texts to survive today. It is therefore interesting to examine the teachings of these texts, considering the possibility that they are close to, if not identical with, the original teachings of the historical Buddha. According to Lebkowicz, Ditrich, and Pecenko, they are pre-monastic. Fausböll says that “we see here a picture not of life in monasteries, but of the life of hermits in its first stage. We have before us not the systematizing of the later Buddhist church, but the first germs of a system, the fundamental ideas of which come out with sufficient clearness.” Since the Buddha himself founded Buddhist monasticism, and the lands and buildings had already begun to be donated and built during his lifetime, this must have been very early indeed, when many monastics still lived or wandered solitary or in small groups. Alexander Wynne, citing the Atthaka, suggests that “much of what is found in the Suttapiṭaka is earlier than ca. 250 B.C., perhaps even more than one hundred years older than this,” i.e., ca. 350 BCE at least. This is 50 years or so after the Buddha’s passing, for which Wynne accepts Gombrich’s date of 404 BCE. If we allow a margin for error of about 20 years, this is 30 to 80 AB approximately. In the Christian tradition, this would correspond to the late canonical period (approx. 60–110 CE).

The Sutta Nipata consists of mixed verse and prose in five sections. The Atthakas and Parayanas consist of sixteen and seventeen short discourses or similar texts, thirty-three in all. In English translation, it consists of sixty-eight pages, approximately 13,000 words, longer than the Tao Te Ching (7,000 words) or the Christian Q gospel (6,000 words). They do not appear to have been as edited as the nikayas, probably because they are written in verse. The terminology and conceptual structures seem to be pre-nikaya and still in a process of formation (e.g., an interdependent origination consisting of seven links instead of ten or twelve, with similar but more protean terminology, while ignorance is referred to but in a somewhat different way). The syntax is fresh and lively, full of vitality and enthusiasm. The tone is positive, even heroic. It is exciting to think that these may be the oldest surviving discourses, a literal remnant of the Buddha himself and one of the original seeds of the discourses of the Pali Canon.

Here I have used the English translation of V. Fausböll, published in 1881 in Max Müller’s Sacred Books of the East series. Although there are more modern and poetical translations of the Sutta Nipata, Fausböll’s literal translation has the virtue of adhering closely to the Pali as far as I can tell so that there is less danger of misconstruing an interpretation of a modern translator for an original view of the Buddha. I have also compared several other translations, especially that of K.R. Norman.

The Atthaka addresses such basic concerns as desire, attachment, philosophy, mindfulness, detachment, the nature of Buddhahood (referred to as the ‘Sage,’ like the Tao Te Ching, and ‘Lord’), and the path. The discourses emphasize the importance of independence and disdain philosophizing and seeking salvation through others. We must save ourselves. The Buddha opposes the doctrine of self-purification through the cultivation of inward peace to the doctrine that the practice of philosophizing based on speculation and argument purifies one. Even at this early date, we see the Buddha celebrated and even worshipped as a literal descendent of the Sun, a ‘Sage,’ a ‘Seer,’ and a Perfect Buddha (‘perfectly or self-enlightened’). The texts state that the Buddha has been reborn from the Tushita (‘joyful’) dimension, associated with the bodhisattva doctrine. The texts describe the  Buddha as having the physical characteristics of a great man and as having the psychic power of telepathy. The texts also refer to the realm of the divine beings, including earthbound spirits and Mara. The texts describe the path as both gradual and instantaneous. The Buddha prohibits some of the same superstitious practices, especially prognostication, which he criticizes in the first discourse of the Digha Nikaya, the Net of Confusion (Brahmajala Sutta). As observed by Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, asceticism is deemphasized. One observes pain but one does not cultivate it. The liberated person is free from attachment and revulsion and sees happiness everywhere. They are friendly and tolerant to all, much like the kingly sage of Laozi. These texts, especially the Parayana, introduce the same question-and-answer format that structures almost all the discourses, suggesting that this may have been the major teaching method used by the historical Buddha.

The study of the Atthaka and Parayana provides a window into the archaic teaching of the Buddha. It gives us an opportunity amongst other things to assess the rationalist assumptions of the so-called modern or secular Buddhist movement. In these chapters one recognizes a broad range of doctrinal topics, including a system of epistemological, soteriological, ontological, cosmological, Buddhological, and ethical worldviews that anticipate similar doctrines that we find more thoroughly worked out in the nikayas.

In the following sections I will summarize the worldviews implicit in these texts in broad outline.

PROLOGUE OF THE PARAYANAVAGGA

The Atthaka and Parayana consist mostly of direct teachings of the Buddha or short question-and-answer sessions with individuals with little or no additional historical or biographical details. The single exception is the Prologue to the Parayana, called the Vatthugatha (lit. ‘story in verse’). Because of its singular nature in the context of these texts, I am going to summarize it here. Both Rhys Davids and Law place the Parayana before the Atthaka, but Law specifically excludes the Prologue, suggesting that it is later, though he does not mention it elsewhere in his scheme. It may, therefore, be the oldest Buddhist historical account.

The story is situated south of Savatthi, the capital of Kosala, where many of the later discourses are also located. Bavari, a brahman, whose name means “enemy of worldly existence,” dwelled near Alaka, on the banks of the Godhavari, a river in the territory of Assaka, ”wishing for nothingness.” Assaka was the most southern great state. The Godavari river is the second longest river in India, after the Ganges, and runs from west to east across central India. Like many renunciants of the time, including the Buddha, Bavari lived outside a village where he could obtain the necessities, including enough money, to hold a  great sacrifice. After this, another brahman arrived, “with swollen feet, trembling, covered with mud, with dust on his head,” who immediately demanded five hundred pieces of money. Bavari treated the other brahman with the utmost courtesy and respect but apologetically explained that having spent all his money on a great sacrifice, he had no money left to give to the brahman. Offended, even enraged, the brahman proceeded to curse Bavari, declaring that after seven days his head would cleave into seven pieces. This is a common curse that one finds repeated elsewhere in the Pali Canon.

Bavari became sorrowful and began to waste away, taking no food, but at the same time he continued to delight in meditation. After some time the benevolent divine being of the place, presumably a benign earthbound spirit, appeared to Bavari and explained to him that the other brahman is a hypocrite and an impostor, knowing nothing about heads or head splitting, thus rather strangely segueing into the topic of the story and indeed of the chapter. Thus, the Parayana is in fact a precis of the salvific wisdom of the teaching itself.

Bavari asks the divine being to explain to him about heads and head splitting, but the divine being does not know anything about it, saying that this knowledge is limited to buddhas. Bavari asks the divine being who he can approach for an explanation, and the divine being tells Bavari that a World Ruler, a descendent of King Ikshvaku (Skt. Okkaka), the first king of the solar dynasty, has gone out of Kapilavatthu, the capital of the Shakyans. This identification of the Buddha as a descendent of the righteous and glorious king Ikshvaku suggests the descent of Jesus from King David. The solar dynasty is also important in Jainism, since twenty-two out of twenty-four of the Jain tirthankaras belonged to this dynasty, and to Hindus, whose culture hero, Rama, of the Ramayana, also belonged to the prestigious solar dynasty. According to the Buddhist texts the founder of the solar dynasty was Mahasammata, the first king of the current age, who was democratically elected. The divine being describes the Buddha as “light-giving”: “He is, O Brahman, the perfectly enlightened (Perfect Buddha); perfect in all things, he has attained the power of all knowledge, sees clearly in everything; he has arrived at the destruction of all things, and is liberated in the destruction of the upadhis,” referring to the “fuel of life” that precipitates rebirth. “He is Buddha, he is Bhagavat in the world; he, the clearly-seeing, teaches the Dhamma” (V. 1. 17). Bhagavat means “the Adorable One,” and in Hinduism is a term for Krishna or God. This passage again alludes to the salvific knowledge or “power of truth.”

Bavari, his spirits revived, asks the divine being where he might find this chief of the world, this first of men, so that he might go there and worship him. Referring to the Buddha by the Jain term Jina, “Victorious One,” and as a “bull of men,” the divine being tells Bavari that the Buddha is staying in Savatthi. Bavari then goes to his sixteen brahman disciples, including the great seer Pingiya, to go to Savatthi to see the Buddha for themselves. His disciples ask Bavari how they will recognize him. Bavari tells them that the hymns, referring to the Vedas, refer to the physical characteristics of a great man, and that they can recognize him by these signs. Interestingly, no one has identified such a hymn. Bhikkhu Sujato has suggested that the physical characteristics might be Babylonian in origin. Whatever their origin, their presence in the Prologue of the Parayana clearly indicates that they are archaic. Bavari tells his disciples that such a one will either become a peaceful and just World Ruler or a Perfect Buddha who will remove the veil from the world. Bavari also tells them that they will also know the Buddha because he will answer the questions that are in their mind without asking.

Bavari’s disciples travel north to Savatthi to find the Buddha, along with many their own students. The text describes Bavari’s disciples as advanced philosophers and meditators, with matted hair or dreadlocks and wearing animal hides. The Tibetan tradition would call them ‘great adepts’ (mahasiddhas). They travel through a succession of cities, including Savatthi, but finally they find the Buddha at the top of a mountain near Vesali, Magadha, in the Barabar Hills north of Gaya, called the Rock Temple, southeast of Savatthi. Here the Buddha was teaching the monastics, “like a lion roaring in the forest.” Ajita, the leader, beholds the Buddha as a luminary, and recognizes all the physical signs of his greatness. Asking the questions concerning Bavari in his mind, the Buddha tells him that Bavari is 120 years old; his name; that he has three of the physical characteristics of a great man (long tongue, tuft of hair between the eyebrows, and a sheathed penis), and that he is perfect in the three Vedas. Satisfied, Ajita asks the Buddha about the head and head splitting. The Buddha tells Ajita that the head refers to ignorance, and that knowledge (gnosis) cleaves the head, along with belief, thoughtfulness, meditation, determination, and strength.

This metaphorical identification of ignorance with the head and head splitting – the destruction of ignorance – with knowledge is exceptionally interesting and proves among other things that the Buddha’s criticism of “philosophizing” clearly does not extend to a rejection of knowledge or wisdom as such. The implication is that knowledge or wisdom is the salvific principle, as we have discussed elsewhere. To refer to this special kind of knowledge I have used the English word gnosis. Ignorance becomes the root or “head” of the doctrine of interconnectedness. Ajita puts his animal hide on one shoulder, prostrates before the Buddha, and touches his forehead to the ground. Ajita apparently has Bavari’s warrant to act on his behalf, for he tells the Buddha on behalf of Bavari and his disciples that they pay homage to the Buddha’s feet (perhaps Bavari was too old to make this long journey himself, despite his former expression of his wish to do so). The Buddha wishes Bavari and Ajita, described as a young man, well. Wishing them happiness and long life, the Buddha then invites Ajita and the disciples to ask him whatever questions they wish. Ajita and the other disciples then ask the Buddha a series of philosophical and soteriological questions in the next sixteen discourses, which make up the Parayana.

EPISTEMOLOGY – THE SCIENCE OF KNOWING

The Buddha affirms that the only eternal or ultimate truth is consciousness, and that truth is unitary. Thus, it is transdual. For this reason, the Buddha rejects sectarianism, scholasticism, asceticism, rationalism, dogmatism, and debate, and proposes a philosophy of no philosophy, which he identifies with wisdom, rather like Zen.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NO PHILOSOPHY

I am going to start with epistemology, the study of knowing, first, because of the weight that these two chapters put on what I have chosen to call “the philosophy of no philosophy.” No less than eight discourses of the Atthaka (IV. 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13) discuss philosophy, philosophizing, and/or philosophers. In IV.3, the Buddha says, “the dogmas of philosophy are not easy to overcome.” On the other hand, the independent one, i.e., the follower of the Buddha, “has shaken off every (philosophical) view.” This reminds one of the first discourse of the Digha Nikaya, the Brahmajala Sutta, where the Buddha disdains philosophizing as a “base art.” Ironically, this discussion of conflict avoidance breaks out into an open argument between Magandiya and the Buddha (IV. 9.6, 7). The Buddha makes it quite clear that “if a man’s purification takes place by (his philosophical views), or he by knowledge leaves pain behind, then he is purified by another way than the ariyamagga, i.e., the noble way” (IV. 4). The Buddha considers that philosophizing creates division and discord (IV. 5.1), Therefore a monastic “does not depend even on knowledge. He does not associate with those that take up different things, he does not return to any (philosophical) view” (IV. 5. 5). The Pasurasutta (IV. 8) includes an extensive description of philosophical debates that we find elsewhere described in the Pali Canon. “Seeing this,” says the Buddha, “let no one dispute, for the expert do not say that purification (takes place) by that” (IV. 8. 7). Nevertheless, the Buddha acknowledges that philosophy can take one part of the way (IV. 8. 11, V. 14. 3) and appears to distinguish between understanding and “philosophical views” (IV. 9. 13). In antithesis to the view that philosophical knowledge is salvific, the Buddha declares that the truly salvific thing is a state of inward peace and outward indifference. Only this state confers true wisdom and happiness, yet he also praises wisdom (IV. 16. 15; V. 12. 1; V. 17. 13, 15, 17); the texts refer to “inward peace” itself as “truth” (dharma), and trans-rationalism or the trans-linguistic (V. 7. 6-8). He also asserts that the sage does not reject anything (IV. 9. 5) and knowledge liberates him (V. 1. 51). The relationship between knowledge and wisdom is subtle and complex. This notion of the true sage being indifferent to formal learning or academic knowledge strongly reminds one of the Tao Te Ching.

SOTERIOLOGY – THE SCIENCE OF SALVATION

For there to be salvation there must be a “fall.” Thus, the Buddha identifies ignorance and desire as the primary binary that binds us to “reiterated existence” (rebirth) in time. He repudiates desire, grasping, and the body and stresses the inferiority of the body, existence, and the householder life of possessiveness, territoriality, and war. The Buddha rejects self-purification by knowledge, actions (i.e., as in Jainism), religious tradition (Brahmanism), sacrifice, or by following others. He proposes that one must purify oneself through the progressive practice of detached indifference, the cultivation of inner peace (tranquility) and mindfulness or “thoughtfulness,” sitting in secluded meditation in the wilderness, at the foot of a tree, in a cemetery (like the Shaivites), or in a cave on a mountain. The Buddha posits a mode of knowledge which purifies one, which is unitary and transdual and which one can realize by the practice of mental concentration. By these means, one induces a transcendent state of realization that leads to the perfect, immortal, and timeless security of emancipation that extinguishes desire itself. Elsewhere the texts describe meditation as the realization of emptiness, nothingness, or the void, which corresponds to the fundamental ontological state. Emancipation is a state beyond ego-centred consciousness itself. Those who attain this state are “men who have crossed the stream.” The realization of emancipation itself is instantaneous, immediate, and uncharacterizable.

MEDITATION

Buddhism is not merely or even primarily a theory. The Buddha says that he understood the theory of emancipation prior to his enlightenment, but it was not until he understood the praxis of emancipation that he became enlightened and began to teach others. Therefore, it is of special interest to know what the Buddha said about meditation in the Atthaka and Parayana.

The Buddha advises his followers to “cultivate the mind of a recluse.” Instead of seeking salvation through philosophical argument, knowledge, virtue (ethics), or “holy works” (merit), the Buddhist should seek salvation through the cultivation of “inward peace” and tranquility, and the cultivation of an attitude of perfect tolerance, neither accepting nor rejecting anything. The Buddha identifies three types of consciousness that are not conducive to liberation, including “natural consciousness,” insanity, and unconsciousness, the latter being an error that is identified in later discourses as leading to rebirth in the realm of unconscious beings,  just “below” the Five Pure Abodes, the place where non-returners and arhants with residue are reborn interestingly. Thus, the Buddha makes it clear that a type of transcendent consciousness characterizes the attainment of emancipation, also referred to as the “cessation of consciousness,” but it is clear from the text that cessation of consciousness does not imply unconsciousness. Rather, it seems to refer to the impercipience (V. 14. 7) of a “dispossessed mind” (V 16. 26). Once again, we see the importance of collating all relevant texts to avoid misunderstanding. The Buddha advises his followers to be still, without desire; meditative; watching; and to sit down quietly. One is to “drive off the agitations of the mind” with an equanimous, calm, composed mind; thoughtful, with mind liberated; intent on a single object (concentrated).

The Buddha equates meditation with “wishing for nothingness” or “having in view nothingness,” neither grasping nor rejecting anything. Interestingly, the Parayana says that one finds the knowledge of “heads and head-splitting” among buddhas, equating the head with ignorance and head splitting with the abolition of ignorance. Ignorance of course became the root of the interconnectedness in later texts: “Ignorance is the head, know this; knowledge cleaves the head, together with belief [faith], thoughtfulness [mindfulness], meditation [concentration], determination [resolution], and strength [energy]” (V. 1. 51). Therefore, the Buddha is making a distinction between philosophical argument and another sort of knowledge (“having been delivered in the highest deliverance by knowledge”), characterized as wisdom, and referred to as the Divine Eye. A passage in V. 10. 4 seems to allude to the yogic doctrine that one stops breathing in advanced stages of meditation, which one also finds in Patanjali. The culmination of meditation is emancipation, the “extinction” of desire. Yet even the Buddha meditates, the text tells us, a fact reiterated in the later discourses.

ARHANT AND BODHISATTVA

The Atthaka and Parayana make a clear distinction between those who live in the cave, strikingly anticipating Plato’s parable of the cave (Fausböll equates the cave with the body) and those who have crossed the stream (gone to the other shore). This then is the fundamental soteriological project of Buddhism.

The texts call those who have liberated themselves from “reiterated existences” (‘rebirth’ but also time) ‘sage’, brahman (‘knower of the Absolute or Ultimate Reality’), ‘seer,’ a Vedic seer, and “men who have crossed to the other shore.”

The Buddha too is referred to as Sage, Brahman, and Seer, but is also associated with a separate set of specialized terms, including ‘holy,’ ‘fortunate one’, Gotama (the reputed family name of the Buddha, meaning ‘one whose brilliance dispels darkness’), “kinsman of the Adiccas” (‘solar dynasty’), Buddha (‘awakened’), Sakka (‘able,’ the name of the Buddha’s clan), “light-giving,” Perfect Buddha (‘omniscient’ or ‘self-enlightened’), “clearly-seeing” (“all-seeing one”),  “chief of the world,” “perfectly enlightened,” “first of men,” Jina (‘conqueror,’ ‘victor,’ a Jain term),  “bull of men,” Tathagata (‘he who has thus come and gone to that’), ‘noble,’ “thou with the born eye (of wisdom),” as well as hero, divine, exemplary, supreme, and lord.

Brahmans are perfect buddhas (V. 15. 4) (alternatively, the Buddha declares himself a perfect brahman; unlike the Brahman caste of the later discourses that the Buddha criticizes for their worldliness, these brahmans are holy men). The  brahman Bavari defers to the Buddha and refers his students (described as youthful) to the Buddha and recommends that they go to visit him (V. 1. 23). Posala and Pingiya both become followers of the Buddha, despite being a brahman and a seer respectively themselves. The venerable Pingiya says, “There is only one abiding dispelling darkness, that is the high-born, the luminous, Gotama of great understanding, Gotama of great wisdom” (V. 17. 13), thus affirming the primogeniture and singularity of the Buddha, who is self-enlightened, and credits the Buddha for teaching him, a seer (V. 17. 14; cf. V. 17).

The superiority of the Buddha is, therefore, implicit in these texts. Moreover, the texts also imply that the Buddha is referring to an ancient tradition that underlies Brahmanism itself as a sort of “spiritual Brahmanism.” While the monastic who succeeds in the Buddhist project clearly emancipates himself from the world, the text distinguishes his attainment from that of the Buddha, who is all-understanding, all-seeing, chief of the world, perfectly enlightened, first of men, and supreme. Moreover, the texts refer to the Buddha’s having been reborn from the Tushita dimension, which the Pali discourses later identify with the place from which bodhisattvas are reborn. Thus, while we do not find the words “arhant” or “bodhisattva” in these texts, the same distinction that underlies these terms is clearly implied. There is therefore no evidentiary or necessary logical basis for the dogma that the distinction between the arhant and the bodhisattva is not original.

THE DEATHLESS

The Buddha talks about crossing the stream and going to the other shore, but what does this mean? Is salvation only psychological, or is it also ontological? The Buddha raises this issue when he asks the question, putting it in the mouths of the greedy, “What will become of us, when we die away from here?” The Buddha’s answer is clear as far as the wicked are concerned: desire for reiterated existence leads to rebirth in unfortunate states. But what of those who liberate themselves from sensual desire? What sort of future state do they experience? The Buddha makes it clear that salvation does not imply rebirth in any other world, because all worlds are subject to the same suffering. Therefore, the liberated ‘sage’ neither longs for rebirth nor is reborn in any state. Does this mean that they, not being reborn, cease to exist in any sense? Is the Buddha here teaching some sort of mystical nihilism? The sage is beyond designation because they do not cling to any philosophical view. They are uncharacterizable, because they do not cling, neither accepting nor rejecting anything. “Having gone to the other shore, such a one does not return” (IV. 5. 8).

The Buddha says that “only the name (nama) remains undecayed of the person who has passed away” (IV. 6. 5). The Buddha may simply be referring to the memory of one’s heirs and descendants.

The Buddha says that the sage “does not enter time, being delivered from time” (IV. 10. 13; cf. 13. 17). He neither belongs to time, nor is he dead (IV. 13. 20). The Buddha also says that consciousness is an eternal truth (IV. 12. 9). This implies that consciousness itself persists in an eternal “now.” For the sage there is no death and no rebirth because there is no time (IV. 13. 8). He goes to the immortal [deathless] region (IV. 16. 6).  The ‘deathless’ is one of the main tropes of the Pali Canon, referred to by the Buddha frequently.

ONTOLOGY – THE SCIENCE OF BEING

Existence is suffering and impermanent. Beings are trapped in an endless cycle of rebirth, but the very impermanent and temporary nature of existence implies that it is possible to escape into non-rebirth by transcending the whole sevenfold system of interconnectedness by which name and form (individuality) lead to “touch” (contact), decay and origin, pleasure and pain (feeling), will (intention), grasping, and finally suffering (ignorance is mentioned elsewhere as “the head”). We recognize here a primitive form of the familiar doctrine of interconnectedness (lit. ‘following from anything as a necessary result with coming into existence’). The law of moral causality driven by intentional mental activity is the essential dynamic. At the same time, the world is illusory, empty, and void.

THE WAY OF THE TRANSDUAL

Whether the Buddha taught the doctrine of the transdual is one of the most hotly contested questions in Buddhist studies. Bhikkhu Bodhi commits Theravada to a dualistic view in his essay, “Dharma and Non-duality.” Therefore, my defence of transdualism (not, note, non-dualism; transdualism includes both non-dualism and dualism, including the dualism of non-dualism and dualism itself, with trans-dualism as the fourth point of the quaternary or “tetralemma”) in this context is bound to be controversial. However, I see no other context in which to interpret the transcendence of good and evil (IV. 4. 3), the non-existence of “notions” or concepts such as equality, lowness, and distinction or equality and inequality (IV. 5. 4, 9. 9, 10. 8, 13), “no desire for both ends” (i.e., extremes) (IV. 6), “single truths” (the context makes it clear that the Buddha is referring to mutually exclusive or contradictory statements, i.e., to the law of contradiction) (IV. 8.1 ), the binary character of the teaching (11. 7), “name and form” (11. 11, V. 2. 6, 12. 5), “the truth is one, there is not a second” (IV. 12 . 7), the “double dhamma, truth and falsehood” (the implication being that the true teaching is transcendent) (12. 9), and ultimate (eternal) and relative truth (relative truth is dualistic, and eternal truth is transdual) (12. 9), as well as numerous additional references in the later discourses. There is in fact only one eternal or absolute truth, mind or consciousness itself, which is transdual and inherently empty yet infinitely differentiating itself in the world by means of the illusion of difference (= atta, self-identity or ego), driven by the ultimate dynamic (will or intention) expressed as cause and effect.

This is moreover the synthetic position, reconciling all other views. It comes as no surprise to discover the theme of the transdual in the Atthaka and Parayana. The identification of realization with the transdual and the essential nothingness, emptiness, or voidness of all extremes is a universal feature of all wisdom traditions and therefore a part of the perennial philosophy (= the ancient tradition). The doctrine of voidness (see below) also implies the transdual because it is empty yet all-inclusive (0 = 1, the primary binary in unity or the yabyum of existence, the cosmic egg).

Any paradox inherently indicates the transdual.

COSMOLOGY – THE SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSE

The Atthaka and Parayana s allude to the familiar elements of Buddhist cosmology, including other worlds, divine beings, Mara, and the Tushita dimension (IV. 16. 1), the latter the dimension from which the Buddha-to-be was reborn. This corresponds to the bodhisattva idea, whereas the rhinoceros (of the Rhinoceros Sutra) is a symbol associated with the solitary buddha or “hermit.”

THE WORLD IS VOID

The Buddha says that “the world is completely unsubstantial” (IV. 15. 3; “look upon the world as void” (V. 16. 4). The realization of the impermanent, insubstantial, illusory, ephemeral, and mirage-like nature of the world corresponds to the experience of the void, nothing, nowhere. Thus, the void, nothing, nowhere become designations of the ultimate nature of the world, the ground of which is reality itself.

THE PLANES OF EXISTENCE

The text represents the world by an equilateral cross with a central point (V.5. 7, 6. 8, 13. 3). This symbol is a universal archetype, like the swastika, the Ethiopian cross, and the central symbol of the Rosicrucian Order, amongst others. The horizontal plane represents the ordinary world of three-dimensional extension, which Buddhists and Taoists describe as the ten thousand worlds – the infinitely differentiated and differentiating order of stars, galaxies, and universes. The vertical vector or ray represents the extraordinary world of vertical extension, ranging from lowest frequency or vibration (the material or sensual polarity referred to as the ‘desire realm’) to the highest (the spiritual polarity referred to as the ‘formless realm’). The central point is the individual point of view, the mind stream, which is not a “self” but rather a trans-temporal sentient continuity that has no extension and therefore no self-identity yet is the root of differentiation itself, without which the world itself is inexplicable.

One does not find the complete Buddhist cosmology of thirty-one planes of existence divided into various worlds and groups of worlds in the Atthaka and Parayana. However, there are tantalizing references to other worlds, divine beings, Mara, and especially the Tushita heaven, the only world that these texts specifically name. The Tushita or “joyful” world is four realms above the human world, third of the sensual realm and twenty-third in the world. The Tushita divine beings include the bodhisattvas, who according to tradition are born here prior to their final birth as a human being. It is intriguing that these texts only name this specific world and specifically mention that the Buddha has been reborn in the human world after having resided in the Tushita dimension.

BUDDHOLOGY – THE SCIENCE OF BUDDHAHOOD

The texts describe the Buddha by his family or clan name of Gotama and as a man, as well as by the mysterious term “tathagata,” ‘he who having come this way has thus gone that way to suchness.’ The texts describe him as wise and great, a World Teacher, as well as having perfect wisdom. The physical characteristics of a great man distinguish him; he is a descendant of the Sun and symbolically identified with the sun and the moon.

THE COSMIC BUDDHA

The Buddha is referred to by a number of honorifics, including ‘sage’, Bhagavat (‘holy’, a follower of Vishnu; the Hindus regard the Buddha as an avatar or emanation of Vishnu), Jina (‘Victorious, also a Jain term), supreme Buddha (‘awakened’), Gotama (‘the one who dispels darkness by brilliance,’ the reputed family name or clan name of the Buddha), ‘recluse’, kinsman of  the Adiccas (‘sun’), “the Isi (‘seer’ or  seer, a direct allusion to the Vedic tradition) of exemplary conduct,” Perfect Buddha (‘one of clear or perfect knowledge’), Shakyan (‘able’, referring to the Buddha’s people), Tathagata (‘one who having come thus has gone to suchness’), master, teacher, bull of men, the man of excellent understanding, the all-seeing one, “hero free from lust,” “thou with the born eye (of wisdom),” “he who shows the past,” “a perfect, accomplished Brahman,” and “this man who sees what is good.”

The Buddha himself is characterized as venerable, light-giving (luminous), perfectly enlightened, clear-sighted (clearly seeing), first of men, best of men, chief of the world, of great understanding (of excellent wise knowledge or great wisdom), “unyoked,” free from passion, “skilled in head-splitting” (i.e., dispelling ignorance, located in the head), accomplished, cultivated, houseless (homeless), free from commotion, “liberated, who leaves time behind,” doubtless, accomplished in all things, aware of past shapes, leaderless, “knowing all the faces of consciousness,” divine, famous, “darkness dispelling,” high-born, and free from harshness.

Thus, the texts describe the Buddha as perfectly wise; ecstatic; transcendent or god-like; virtuous or self-restrained; noble; and enlightened or luminous.

The text clearly distinguishes the “men who have crossed the stream” by a number of superlative qualities.

ETHICS

The Buddha advocates an ordinary ethical life of moderation and self-restraint. Although it would be a logical error to infer that because this is the oldest surviving text, it necessarily is complete and therefore exclusive of all other texts – many other similar texts were presumably lost or subsumed into later texts – what the text does say is of more than passing interest since this is the closest we can get to what the Buddha actually taught, composed perhaps no later than a single generation (20 years?) after his death. The text has a fresh and lively voice and originality of diction that radiate the vigour and vitality of beginnings. In particular, it appears as a virtual hologram of the doctrines found in the nikayas, including such advanced concepts as transduality, the unity of truth, the philosophy of no philosophy, gradual and instantaneous realization, rebirth, moral causality, Mara, divine beings, other dimensions, the Tushita world, and the transcendent nature of Buddhahood itself. Far from being late ideas, these doctrines are clearly inherent in the fundamental substrate of the Buddhist oeuvre. This contrasts sharply with the modern secularist view that the historical development of Buddhist doctrine represents a degeneration from an original ideal devoid of “superstitious” elements. The Atthaka and Parayana are extremely sophisticated philosophical documents, comparable to the Tao Te Ching.

A close evaluation of the Atthaka and Parayana discovers allusions to transdualism; trans-rationalism; rebirth (which some modern or secular-minded modern Buddhists would like to abandon); ethical indifference (very like Jesus’ injunction not to judge); individualism; the nirvana element or “realm”; emptiness; instantaneous enlightenment; the planes of existence; and the perfect wisdom of the Buddha, including the physical characteristics of a great man.  The Atthaka and Parayana do not support the view that these doctrines are later accretions. Rather, the whole oeuvre appears to inhere in its historical ground. To say that they do not originate with the Buddha is therefore a dogmatic and unprovable assumption.

BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL

The monastic should not desire extremes. The one who clings not abides in a state of “inward peace;” they do not grasp or reject anything. The true brahman does not cling to virtue or holy works, either to their presence or to their absence. Holy works do not lead them. The sage does not prefer anything. They are indifferent and tolerant. The “philosophizers” call what they devote themselves to “good” (the irony is palpable). Fools make their own views the truth, therefore they hold others to be fools (IV. 12. 5). Therefore, the brahman does not cling to virtue, holy works, merit, good, or evil (IV. 4. 3). He lets it all go. This view is the opposite of the view of the religious judgmental moralizer and allows for moral ambiguity of the type that we see for example in the Angulimala Sutta, which the Tibetans highly developed.

CONCLUSION

Barring a major new discovery, the Atthaka and Parayana are as close as we can get to the actual utterance of the historical Buddha. At the same time, they are still interpretations developed over the course of the first few decades after the Buddha’s death, based in all sincerity on an oral transmission that there is no reason not to believe began soon after the Buddhas passing. Once we recognize that the true object of Buddhist studies is not the Buddha but the teaching, the historical problem becomes less palpable since the person of the Buddha, himself merely one of many, becomes less significant. Contrast this with Christianity, for which the central fact of the resurrection assumes preeminent importance since without this magical act God dooms humanity to literal damnation for eternity. The Buddha encouraged independent inquiry, denied that anyone could save another, and referred all spiritual seekers to their own judgment. He rejects salvation by philosophical argument, ordinary knowledge, good works, merit, or others. The Buddha encouraged his followers to be tolerant and appreciate different points of view, for the teaching is trans-rational, trans-linguistic (see Norman, V. 7. 1076), and experientially and ultimately individual, though one can also understand it (being transdual) as a collective phenomenon too. Non-sectarianism and the rejection of fundamentalism both follow logically from these premises, and the Buddha strongly emphasizes the futility of dogmatism, philosophical debate, and argument. Later texts portray the Buddha as seeking out common ground, compassionate and concerned, and addressing the individuality of those who came to him for guidance. The teaching is not reducible to a formula. It is an active search for the meaning of the transcendental object translated into the four dimensions of human experience which are always changing. The teaching is an unstoppable wheel that turns forever. Thus, today we might understand the omniscience of the Buddha as perfect metaphysical understanding through the actual experience of the clarity of enlightenment, whereas those of earlier ages had another understanding such as that of the Jains. The universe overall may be entropic, but the manifestation of the transcendental hyperobject creates negentropic memes that also have the capacity to disseminate themselves across space and time. This is the definition of a “dharma age.”

The concurrence between the Atthaka and Parayana and the nikayas, which constitute the next stratum of development in the Rhys Davids/Law chronology, is remarkable, showing the care with which the originators of these texts assimilated earlier material. The development of the Pali Canon is not random, haphazard, accidental, or arbitrary, and we see many of the same tropes that we have identified repeated and expanded in subsequent discourses. From this perspective we may regard the Pali Canon itself as a continuous meditation on the original teachings of the Buddha. There also appear to be many similarities between these ideas and those of the legendary Laozi in the Tao Te Ching, a book that must be earlier than the oldest known text which scholars date to about 300 BCE. According to tradition these teachings go back to the 6th century BCE at least. Thus, even though this specific text may or may not have influenced the Buddha, it is possible that the same pan-Himalayan wisdom tradition that the compilers of the Tao Te Ching drew on as well influenced him. In this context the speculation that the Buddha was of mixed race and non-Aryan, suggesting the possibility of a Mongol or even Chinese influence on Buddhism, is fascinating. Taoist tradition makes Laozi and the Buddha contemporaries, which need not be historically factual to allude to a symbolic truth.

The Atthaka and Parayana present a comprehensive worldview, including theories of knowledge, salvation, the nature of being, the universe, the Buddha, and ethics, remarkably similar to recent developments in modern philosophy and quantum physics, including the centrality of the act of observation (reality of consciousness), wave-particle duality (the transdual), and quantum entanglement (interconnectedness). The Buddha rejected sectarianism, dogmatism, and intolerance, affirmed the primacy of consciousness and the value of the human individual, saw the central problem of human beings as their ignorance of the true nature of reality, and called upon us as individuals to wake up and to take personal responsibility for the implications of our thoughts, words, and actions; we must each save ourselves through radical self-realization, which is, paradoxically, the realization of ‘not-self’. In particular, the Buddha articulated the mechanics of ethics – the Law of Moral Causality – whereas Western philosophy has fallen into ethical nihilism in the wake of Nietzsche’s “death of God.” The Buddha saw that religion, with its exoteric reliance on dogmas, rites, and rituals, completely fails to solve the human problem.

Unlike the poetic mysticism of the Tao Te Ching, with which the Atthaka and Parayana exhibit many other affinities, the Buddha expounds a rational spirituality that is articulate, profound, clear, and explicit yet leads beyond rationality and mysticism alike to direct experiential realization. Against those who would like to eliminate rational inquiry altogether, the Buddha spent the last 45 years of his life engaging in question-and-answer dialogues with all those who came to him seeking answers. Not merely a mystic, he was also a philosopher and a political and ethical activist, though he disdained argument and debate and realized that reason leads beyond itself to something greater. Thus, he criticized, realized, and transcended religion, both in his person and in his teachings.

Hajime Nakamura’s astonishingly erudite chronological survey of Indian Buddhism  summarizes the characteristics of “Original Buddhism” as follows:

• Buddhism lacked a specialized technical vocabulary and derived its terms from the Ajivaka and Jain religions.
• Dogmatism was avoided in favour of a skeptical attitude.
• Most Buddhist recluses lived alone in solitude, as hermits, in huts thatched with straw, although some monastics lived together with their fellow ascetics. Buddhist hermit recluses were referred to as “seers,” not monks.
• Buddhist hermit recluses practised meditation by stilling the mind in woods, forests, and caves, including graveyards.
• Buddhist nuns existed by 300 BCE.
• The rules of monastic discipline were quite simple, addressing primarily diet, clothing, and dwellings, as well as basic moral injunctions like not stealing, not lying, universal friendliness, and overcoming anger, arrogance, and pleasant and unpleasant feelings.
• The Buddha was regarded as an excellent person but not deified.
• Buddhism was both the teaching of how to become a buddha, and what the buddhas (plural) taught.
• Shakyamuni (Siddattha Gotama, the historical Buddha) was not the only buddha, and Buddhism is not only the teaching of the historical Buddha so-called.
• All excellent Buddhist ascetics were called “buddhas.” Therefore, anyone could, in principle, become a buddha.
• There were Buddhist orders that did not accept Shakyamuni, including that of Devadatta, which may have survived until the 4th century (another authority says 7th century). The latter were known as “Gotamaka” Buddhists.

Perhaps surprisingly, many of these doctrines are compatible with later Buddhism, including syncretism; non-sectarianism; ecumenism; the anti-monastic “great adept” (mahasiddha) tradition of Tibet; the Shaivite tradition of meditating in graveyards; the rejection of an elaborate Vinaya; the emphasis on compassion or “universal friendliness”; the belief that the attainment of Buddhahood is in principle available to all; the belief in many buddhas past, present, and future; de-emphasizing the historical Buddha; and the belief in multiple Buddhist lineages and traditions. Thus, the doctrines of Original Buddhism strengthen rather than weaken the claim of the Mahayana to represent the authentic teaching, even when considered historically, contrary to the claims of Theravadin dogmatists. It also shows the polemical bias of the Pali Canon. The Buddha must have had successors who were also capable of interpreting the teaching, or Buddhism has no utility and is moot.

POSTSCRIPT

I have also compiled an alternative list of items from multiple sources, which might be regarded as the oldest Buddhist scriptures, more or less (none of which can be said to correspond to the words of the historical Buddha, however).

1. Acchariyabbhuta Sutta (MN 123): Likely late 5th century BCE, as some sources suggest it may not be among the earliest teachings.
2. Admonition to Rahula (Ambalatthikarahulovada) (MN 61): Likely 5th century BCE, but possibly composed earlier, reflecting teachings contemporaneous with the Buddha.
3. Anagata Sutta (AN 5.77): Likely late 5th century BCE, as some scholars argue for a later composition than earlier suttas.
4. Anapanasati Sutta (MN 118): 4th–3rd century BCE range, acknowledging its systematic presentation of meditation.
5. Anattalakkhana Sutta (SN 22.59): Likely 5th century BCE, emphasizing its importance in conveying the doctrine of non-self.
6. Ariyapariyesana Sutta (MN 26): Likely early 5th century BCE, encapsulating the Buddha’s quest for enlightenment.
7. Ariyavamsa Sutta (AN 4.28): Likely 3rd century BCE, as some scholars view it as a later addition.
8. Ariyavasa Sutta (AN 10.19): Potentially late 4th century BCE, given its themes.
9. Atthakavagga (Sn 4): Likely pre-3rd century BCE, aligning with its status as part of the oldest layers of the Sutta Nipata.
10. Atthavasa Vagga (AN 2.28): Likely 5th century BCE, reflecting early ethical teachings.
11. Brahmajala Sutta (DN 1): Likely 5th century BCE, with debates about its exact dating.
12. Cula-Malunkyovada Sutta (MN 63): Late 4th to early 3rd century BCE, with its teachings often seen as later than the core doctrines.
13. Cula-Saccaka Sutta (MN 35): Likely mid-5th century BCE.
14. Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (SN 56.11): Likely late 5th century BCE; recognized as a pivotal discourse.
15. Dhammapada (KN): Likely compiled around the 3rd century BCE, but reflecting much earlier oral traditions.
16. The Excellence of the Discipline (Vinaya reference): Likely 5th century BCE, as it refers to early monastic regulations.
17. Future Fears (EA; AN 5.77): Likely late 5th century BCE.
18. Itivuttaka (KN): Likely around the 3rd century BCE.
19. Kalama Sutta (AN 3.65): Likely late 4th century BCE.
20. Khaggavisana Sutta (Sn 1.3): Likely early 5th century BCE.
21. Khanda Sutta (SN 22.48): Likely early 5th century BCE.
22. Khuddakapatha (KN): Pre-3rd century BCE, reflecting earlier oral compositions.
23. Lineage of the Noble One (EA; AN 4.28): Likely late 4th century BCE.
24. Mahapadana Sutta (DN 14): Likely 5th century BCE, but with later additions.
25. Mahaparinibbana Sutta (DN 16): Likely shortly after the Buddha’s death, possibly late 5th century BCE.
26. Mahasaccaka Sutta (MN 36): Likely late 5th century BCE.
27. Mahasatipatthana Sutta (DN 22): Likely mid-5th century BCE, highlighting mindfulness practices.
28. Mangala Sutta (Sn 2.4): Likely early 5th century BCE.
29. Muni Sutta (Sn 2.12): Likely 5th century BCE.
30. Parayanavagga (except prologue) (Sn 5): Pre-3rd century BCE.
31. Patimokkha (V): Likely 5th century BCE.
32. Questions of Upatisa (EA): Likely late 5th century BCE.
33. Rahulavada Sutta (MN 62): Likely 5th century BCE.
34. Sagathavagga (SN 1): Likely 5th century BCE.
35. Sakkapanha Sutta (DN 21): Likely late 4th century BCE.
36. Samannaphala Sutta (DN 2): Likely early 5th century BCE.
37. Sariputta Sutta (Sn 4.16): Likely early 5th century BCE.
38. Satipatthana Sutta (MN 10): Likely 4th century BCE, reflecting systematic teachings on mindfulness.
39. Sigalaka Sutta (DN 31): Likely late 5th century BCE.
40. Sikkhapada (V): Likely 5th century BCE.
41. Sīlas (V): Likely 5th century BCE.
42. Sutta Nipata, including the Rhinoceros Sutta, the Octet Chapter (Atthaka Vagga), and the Chapter on the Way to the Beyond (Parayana Vagga) (KN): Likely pre-3rd century BCE oral compositions.
43. Tathagata Sutta (SN 22.86): Likely late 4th century BCE.
44. Theragatha (KN) and Therigatha (KN): Likely pre-3rd century BCE, reflecting earlier oral compositions.
45. Verses of the Sage (EA; Sn 1.1): Likely 5th century BCE.

---

[1] Scholars traditionally believe that the Pali Canon was first written down on palm leaves during the Fourth Buddhist Council, during the reign of King Valagamba of Anuradhapura in the 1st century BCE, 29-17 BCE, but more recent scholarship puts the date closer to 89-77 BCE, less than two centuries after the dharma was codified during the reign of Ashoka (ca. 261BCE), and just about three centuries after the ‘passing’ (parinibbana) of the Buddha according to the modern reckoning.

[2] A separate stance has been taken by Stanislaw Schayer, a Polish scholar, in the 1930s. Schayer searched in the early texts for ideas that contradict the dominant doctrinal positions of the early canon. According to Schayer, these ideas have “been transmitted by a tradition old enough and considered to be authoritative by the compilers of the Canon. The last conclusion follows of itself: these texts representing ideas and doctrines contradictory to the generally admitted canonical viewpoint are survivals of older, pre-canonical Buddhism.”

[3] This is the Khaggavisanasutta, the famed Rhinoceros Sutra, which advocates the life of a homeless wanderer, “as a beast unbound in the forest goes feeding at pleasure,” free of emotional entanglements.

[4] Not accepted as early by Rhys Davids or Law. Law put these works at #7 out of 10, more recent than the nikayas and even the Jatakas. Gombrich seems to place the composition of most of the nikayas in the mid-4th century CE, about 55 years after the parinibbana. Rupert Gethin thinks that they are somewhat more recent. However, Gethin’s own statement that they are the product of the “first few generations” after the Buddha’ death places them no later than about 300 BCE. Hajime Nakamura puts their composition during the time of Ashoka, about 250 BCE. See Gethin, “Gethin on Gomrich” (see References for full bibliographic citations).

[5] The Atthakavagga also survives in Chinese translation as an independent work. Hajime Nakamura opines that it is likely that these existed during the Buddha’s lifetime (Indian Buddhism, 45).

[6] For comparison, the Christian canonical period extends from 30 to 160 CE. This period includes many non-canonical texts as well, especially after 95 CE. Q, the original Christian scripture (reconstructed), is dated to 40–80 CE.

[7] See Wikipedia, “Buddhist Modernism” and “Secular Buddhism.” Some other cognate terms are agnostic Buddhism, “ignostic” Buddhism, atheistic Buddhism, pragmatic Buddhism, modern Theravada, progressive Theravada, original Buddhism, core Buddhism, mainstream Buddhism, Protestant Buddhism, British Buddhism, and academic Buddhism.

[8] “On the Thirty-Two Marks.” Coincidentally, there are thirty-two base pairs that define the sixty-four codons of the human genetic code.

[9] Establishing a principle of proportionality between the marks and one’s degree of realization.

[10] Ignorance is also described as a shroud that covers the world in the Parayanavagga.

[11] Presumably these were brahman recluses contemporary with the Buddha. Norman simply refers to them as “brahmans.”

[12] Gaccato amatam disam, lit. ‘goes to the ambrosial quarter.’ Pali amatam refers to amrita, a.k.a. soma, the psychedelic drink of the gods that confers deathlessness or timelessness in Indian tradition, the recipe for which has been lost.

[13] “The teaching of the Buddha as found in the Pali Canon does not endorse a philosophy of non-dualism of any variety, nor, I would add, can a non-dualistic perspective be found lying implicit within the Buddha’s discourses.”

[14] The possibility that the universe that we experience is a three-dimensional projection of a two-dimensional diffraction pattern or hologram at the event horizon of a black hole is a serious theory of modern science.

[15] Centred on the sacred Kunlun Mountains in eastern Tibet. According to Tibetan tradition Bon came from Laozi.

[16] Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, 57ff.

References:

S. Dammika (Edicts of Ashoka, n. 38, Wheel Publication 386/87): 1, 2, 3, 5, 12, 15, 18
B.C. Law/Rhys Davids: 4, 13, 14, 19, 20
Gregory Schopen: 7
Hajime Nakamura: 8, 16, 21, 24
A.K. Warder: 10
Wikipedia: 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 22, 23, 25

Bibliography

Allen, C. The Buddha and Dr. Führer. London: Haus Publishing, 2008.

Bodhi. “Dharma and Non-duality” (1998). http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/bodhi/bps-essay_27.html.

Dhammika. “Footprints in the Dust: A Study of the Buddha’s Travels.” http://www.bhantedhammika.net/essays/footprints-in-the-dust-a-study-of-the-buddhas-travels.

Early Christian Writings. http://www.earlychristianwritings.com.

Fausböll, V., trans. The Sutta-Nipata: A Collection of Discourses, Being One of the Canonical Books of the Buddhists. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881.

Gethin, R. “Gethin on Gombrich, ‘What the Buddha Thought.'” https://networks.h-net.org/node/6060/reviews/16095/gethin-gombrich-what-buddha-thought.

Law, B.C. “Chronology of the Pali Canon.” http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebsut053.htm.

Lebkowicz, L.F., T. Ditrich, and P. Pecenko, trans. The Way Things Really Are: A Translation of Book IV of the Sutta-Nipata. N.p.: Buddha Dharma Education Association, n.d. http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/Sutta-nipataBM6.pdf.

Levman, Bryan. “Cultural Remnants of Indigenous Peoples in the Buddhist Scriptures.” Buddhist Studies Review, 30(2) (January 2014), 145-80. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276914202_Cultural_Remnants_of_the_Indigenous_Peoples_in_the_Buddhist_Scriptures.

Mills, L.K., trans. Sutta Nipata. N.p.: Sutta Central, 2015. https://suttacentral.net/files/snp.pdf.

Nakamura, Hajime. Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes. 1980; rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1987.

Norman, K.R., trans. The Group of Discourses. 2^nd ed. Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001. http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documents/SuttaNipata_Norman_1997-2001.pdf.

Pande, G.C. Studies in the Origin of Buddhism. 1957; rev. ed. Motilal Banarsidass, 1995. http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documents/Studies%20in%20the%20Origins%20of%20Buddhism_Pande.pdf.

Pannobhasa, trans. The Atthakavagga. N.p.: Path Press Publications, 2012.

Perimeter Institute. “Physics of Information: Quantum Entanglement, Black Holes and Holographic Universe” (YouTube video/CBC Radio broadcast). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HIJ44AtCCi8.

Saddhatissa, H.R., trans. The Sutta-Nipata. 1985; rpt. Abbingdon: Curzon Press, 1998.

Sariputta (attributed). Niddesa. The eleventh division of the Khuddaka Nikaya in the Pali Canon has been published by the Pali Text Society in Pali. It is a commentary on the Atthaka and Parayana vaggas. It has not been translated into English.

Wikipedia. Kunlun Mountain (Mythology). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunlun_Mountain_(mythology).

———-. Presectarian Buddhism. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pre-sectarian_Buddhism.

Wynne, A. “How Old Is the Suttapitaka?” http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebsut056.htm.